INTERROGATION REPORT


COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

NIC REPORT NO : 248/68

NIC CASE NO : FET

DATE OF REPORT : 5/3/68

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE OF INFO : 30 January - 1 February 1968

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, VIETNAM

REFERENCE : None

This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 4 February 1968 in SAIGON City, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for further exploitation.

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

US EMBASSY (OSA)

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

ATTACHMENTS:

None

MAR 27 1968

CONFIDENTIAL
1. Company 3, VC Independent Battalion 6 was told to prepare to move out on 29 January 1968. The unit left AN THANH Village, BEN LUC District (province not supplied), at 0200 hours 30 January. Carrying their flag, the soldiers marched along the road (which Source would not identify), toward Saigon. The used a battery-operated loudspeaker to call out the local people. On the night of 30 January the commanding officer told the unit that their objective was to attack and to liberate the prisoners in CHI NOA Prison. He also said that the unit might be used in support action in Saigon, but gave no precise targets. However, Company 3 lost its way and attacked other smaller Government of Vietnam (GWN) units.

2. The VC's objective in the countrywide fighting was to liberate the entire country and to request the United States to give freedom back to the Vietnamese People. (Field Comment: Source gave standard party replies to most of the questions asked of him). Source believed that the VC could liberate the country in the near future, and did not know anything about the VC's receiving assistance from foreign countries in obtaining their objective. Source's superiors also told him that the local people would help the VC, which Source found to be the case. While the unit marched through the rural areas surrounding Saigon, the people voluntarily gave the soldiers food and helped them to carry their equipment.

3. Source's superiors also said that although there would be general attacks all over the country, the VC's maximum effort would be directed at liberating Saigon. The VC had talked earlier of applying force to pressure the GVN into negotiations. However, negotiations were not mentioned to the political cadres in connection with the TET attack. (Field Comment: Source was not cooperative, refused to go into detail on his past activities, and would only talk about what happened in Saigon during the TET attack. He is probably knowledgeable on a much wider variety of subjects than he would admit. Most of his answers were standard Party responses.)